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This paper developes a two sector endogenous growth model which can gen-
erate multiple steady state equilibria each with their own rate of growth. It
applies this model to a global analysis ofinternational trade and shows that
the world economy too may have multiple stead}~ state equilibria each with
their own rate of gtowth. Furthermore the transition to one of these steady
states is interesting and may involve reversals in trade direction, growth
rates and income levels. Specific cases are examined where international
trade reduces a country's growth rate to zero, where international trade
pulls up the average growth rate in the world economy and also where inter-
national trade pulls down the average growth rate in the world economy and
finally where international trade allows one country's growth rate to catch
up and overíake that of another.Introduction
'1'his papcr derives a two sector model of endogenous growth with the property that there may
exist multiple steady state equilibria each with their own rate ot growth. '1'hia paper then applies
this model to the gloóa! analysis of ttade dynamics in a two country general equilibrium world
and shows that there may exist multiple steady states for the world economy also. As a result of
this multip6city of equilibria the transition to a steady state in the world economy may involve
reversals of trade direction, income levels and relative growth rates. In specific examples this paper
shows how international trade may cause the average rate of growth in the world economy to tise
(or alternatively, fall), how trade may cause an individual economy to stagnate and finally how
trade can cause a relatively low income, slow growing economy to catch up and overtake the income
and growl.h rate of a higher income, faster growing country ! The global nature of these autarkir
and trade dynamics is interesting because much of the endogenous growth literature restricts itself
to analyzing steady state growth paths.
What is the intuition or philosophy behind these results ? It is that, due to the existence of
multiple equilibria, the `fundamental' chazacteristics of an economy will not be able to determine
the relative growth rates of two countries in autarky. However when these economies are linked by
a common price under international trade, these `fundamentals' will be able to determine which
country will grow faster in the long run. This is why the transition from autarky to a long run trade
equilibrium may involve reversals of relative growth rates. It is also intuitive that the prevalence
of multiple steady state equilibria is not restricted to the autarkic model and that, although which
country grows fastest under international trade is determined, the absolute value of a country's
rate of growth is not determined.
'I'his paper contributes Lo the literature in two main arcas, the dynarnic analysis of iuternational
trade and growth theory. 'I'he contribution to the dynamic analysis of international trade is
threefold. E'irstly, this paper is a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model and so extends the work of
Onika and llzawa [15] both to the endogenous growth Gterature and to the overlapping generations
Gamework. Secondly, although the intuition may seem similaz to Grossman and Helpman [10]
chaper 8, Krugman [11] and Young [20], in that this paper is a`learning by doing' generated
1growttr and trade model, therc is an important difference between those models and this model.
In those papers, comparative advantage is not driven by fundamentals, it is arbitraay. Learning
by doing will reinforce any initial international pattern of specialization. This is not the case in
this paper, which follows Stokey [19] in assuming that sectoral learning by doing effects spill over
sufliciontly to thc~ rest of the economy to ensure that the direction of trade is not a trivial problem.
'fhus in this paper (undamental characteristics of an economy influence the trade dynamics and
long n~n equilibrium. 1'hirdly the modelling of a dynamic world economy with multiple steady
state growth equilibria is itself a significant contribution.
The contribution of this paper to endogenous growth theory can also be placed under three
headings. Firstly it extends and complements the literature using the Lucas [12] model of en-
dogenous growth. Chamley [9] has shown how that model can also generate multiple steady state
growth paths with different rates of growth, however preferences have to be of the C.L.S. form
and tractable analysis of the transitional dynamics have to be restricted to a local analysis near a
steady state. The advantage of the overlapping generations framework is that the analysis is global
ancl prok~rencos rxn be more gcneral. Secondly, thc modclling of technical progress is notr`worth,y.
Many papors in the litcrature, for example sec lioldrin ['l] or Boldrin and Itustichini [S], modol
the growth externality as being a function of present day variables, usually the aggregate capital
stock or capital to labor ratio in a given period. 'l'hese models are prohlcmatic in the sense that
the explaination for the growth externality should not be `learning', since if the capital stock is
decrcasing along its path to the steady state then `knowledge' will be decreasing also ! In this
paper the growth externality is modelled so that knowledge can never be decreasing and thus the
learning metaphor is consistent. Thirdly the paper can provide a model which agrees with De
Long and Summers' [5] empirical finding that faster growing countries tend to have lower relative
prices of investment goods.
'1'his paper is organised as follows. In the first two sections I follow Galor [8] very closely in
describing and deriving the autarkic growth model and its global dynamics. In section 3 I gradually
build up the dynamics of the model under international trade with no transfer of knowledge betwecn
countries. This section first analyzes the dynamics of a small open economy, then the dynamics
2between a small and a large economy and finally the global convergence to an international trade
steady state from any initial starting point. In section 4 I briefly look at the world economy under
perfect transfer of knowledge and show that the phenomena of multiple steady states for the world
econorny can ocrur in this caso too. It derives a simplo model under which the world economy can
bo mudc~llod a.ti a single rlosc~cl oconomy and so may have multiple steacly states.
1 Description of the Model.
1.1 Production
[n this economy there are two goods, a perishable consumption good, Xc, and a non-perishable
investrnent good, Yc. "1'he statc of technology or `knowledge' at time t is denoted by ac and enters
in a labor augmenting way into the producation (unctions of both goods. Both goods are produced




Xt - F~( Ki , ac.l,i ) - f(ki )~t Li
Yc - Fv(Ki , ar.l,i) - Ív(ki )~c Li
or ac - ~ ~` - f~(ki)!i and Jc - ~~L - fv(ké)li
a c e a
is thc capitalrflicicncy labor ratio in the x sector at timo t, k~ - ~y is t.hc
capital:etficiency labor ratio in the y sector at time t, and h- t,h - t are the fraction of the
labor force employed in the X and Y sectors respectively. Fhll employment of factors will hold so
that h"i t K~ - Ií't and L~ f Li - Lc where Kc and Lt are the total stocks of capital and labor
at time t, respectively.
For simplicity capital depreciates fully after one period and so next years capital stock is this
years production of the investment good, that is
Krtr - Yi
I will assume that both f~(ki ) and fy(ki ) have the following properties.
f;(k~) ~ o f,(k~) ~ o !,'(k~) ~ o dk~ ~ olim f;(k~) - 0 lim j;(k~) - oo lim f;(ki) - 0 where i- x,y
k~-,0 k~~0 k~-.oo
Finally [ will assume, as in Galor (8], that the investment good is more capital intensive than
the consumption good, for all factor price ratios.
1.1.1 Factor Prices
The capital and labor markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, when both goods are produced,
the return to capital, ri, is given by the following
r~ - Iy(ki ) - PeÍ~(ki).
where Pi is the price of the consumption good; the investment good is numeraire.
Similarly the return to efficiency Labor we„ is given by
we, - Ï(ki) - ki Í~(ki ) - Ps(f(ki)- kif~(ki)]
As is wcll known in the two sector model when both goods are produced, that given yi~,
k~ ,ki , iu,., and ri can be uniyuely determined. Whcn both ki and pi are given, xi and yi are
uniyuely determined and so we can write,
x~ - x(Pi,k~) and yi - y(P~,ki)
IL can also be shown that under the above assumptions that we can sign the derivatives of
these functions and that in particular yp C 0, yk 1 0, xp 1 0 and xk G 0. In this paper h; will
denote the partial derivative of function h with respect to argument i.
A useful property of the two sector model is the ability to depict in (p,k) space the areas
where the economy chooses to specialize in the production of X or Y, and where it chooses to
produce both goods. Galor [8] shows that a pma~(Pmin) schedule exists above(below) which the
economy produces only the consumption(investment) good. The p,,,;,, and p,,,a~ schedules are
both increasing functions of k and are depicted in Figure 1. Our assumptions about preferences
below, imply that the economy will always produce both goods in autarkic equilibrium, and so
the economy must lie between the p,,,;,, and P,,,a~ schedules. However as we shall show, an open
economy rnay choose to speciaGze in production.
41.1.2 Technological Progress
'I'echnical progress is due to a`learning by doing' externality in one of the two sectors. Following
thc idoa of Romor [1R] and othcrs, knowledge is rnodelled as a stock which may bc added to but
nol. roducrd in carh tiinc period. Spceifically I mudcl thc incroa.tio in knowlcdgc in cach time pc,riod
a.ti bring proportional to th~, amount of the per capita production in one of the two sectors. '1'hus
knowledge in time t is the cumulative sum of past per capita outputs in that sector, that is,
t-t Y r-i X
~c -~ a L~ or ~ o L~ -o ~-o
This specification can be criticised on the grounds that one might expect larger countries to produce
more knowledge. Appendix B shows that most of the analysis goes through with a size dependant
rate of growth of knowledge function - ac -~~-ó oY, or ~;-o oX; - though in the two country
model, the world economy will tend to be dominated by large countries.
1.2 Consumers and Preferences
Agents live in the typical overlapping generations world. '1'hey live for two periods and have
perfect. forsight. '1'hey are endowed with one unit of physical labor only in their first year of life
and they supply iL pcrfcctly inclastically. Individuals born in pcriod t arc charactcrised by a utilit,y
function u(ci,r~~c) where r~,c.i}t are the consumption when young and old respectively. I asstnno
u to be strictly monotonic, strictly quasi-concave and to have the usual boundary conditions
1im.~-,n u~~ - lim~~} yo u~~{ - oo which ensures that both goods are always demanded. I also
impose homotheticity, which is necessary for a balanced steady state rate of growth and that the
savings function is non decreasing in the real rate of return, which is the common assumption
in the single sector overlapping generations economy necessary to ensure a unique momentary
equilibrium r.
Sina~ Y is thc only non-perishable good, thc only way for agents Lo consurnc in thcir second
prriod of lifo is by buying Y when young and living off its earnings tha next lwriod whcn thcy arc
old. "I'hus citt - rp'", where sr denotes thc saving per person -(St will denote Lotal sxvings).
~ See Calor and Ryder [9] and Mount[ord [73] for a discussion of thie íor the standard and endogenous growth,
single scclor ovedapping generalions economy respectively.Savingti :rrc~ chosrn Lo maximisc~ utility and thus
.cc-.c(wc,Pc,rctr,Pctr)- argrnax(n((t~c-.gc) rctr'tic)~
Pc Pctr
From homotheticity we can write
s(wnPnratr,Pctr) - ~cs(w~„Pnratr,Petr)
and since frorn above we know that wej and re are both functions of pc we can write
sc - ~es(Pc,Prtt)
lt can be shown that sy, ~ 0 and since savings are increasing in the real rate of return, sy,i, G 0
1.2.1 Preferences in the Z4~ade Model
In the trade rnodel I will assume log-linear preferences. '1'he reason for this is that, as is well
known, these preferences give rise to a savings function of the form, st -~3wc where 0 G(3 G 1.
'[hus since this expression doesn't depend on second period variables we can write sc - acs(pc).
As will be shown below this assumption reduces the dimensionality of the autarkic growth model
from two to one, and more importantly it reduces the dimensionality of the trade model from three
to two.
1.3 Dynarriic Equilibrium of the Closed Economy
A dynamic equilibrium occurs when all markets clear, that is when an economy is in momen-
tar,y equilibrium, and when the economy also satisfies the state equation that Kc~r - Yc rmder
cunditions of perfect forsight.
To ensure mornentary equilibrium, using Walras' Law, we require St - Acsr(pc,pr~l)Lr - Yc or
from homotheticity,
sc(Pc,Prtt) - y(Pr,~c)
F'rom our assumptions about preferences this defines an implicit function
Pctr - e(kc,Pc)
6
(1)where Bk -~~ G 0 and B- yP-'o' 1 0
~r~t~ p - 'vii~
The state equation, hit~ - Yi, can also be written in efficiency unit form,
ye Yt Yt
kiti -(1
f n) ~~ -( L t n)~ l t oy~) or (1 i~ n)( l f rYxi)
Which ever sector the technological progress takes place in, we will write this as the following
hin~~iuu
kat~ - ~(ki,pa) (~)
Thus the dynamical system is characterised by equations (1) and (2) and is a two dimensional
non-linear difference equation in general.
2 Global Dynamics and Steady State Equilibria
This section will describe the global dynamics of the dynamical system and it will show that it is
characterised by steady state equilibria which will be alternately saddlepath stable and unstable.
7~he dynamirs arF best describad by defining two loc,ii in (F~,k~) spa~,e, the PP and KK lccii. T!:csr
locii are the set of points where p~ - for the YY locus - and the ki - for the KK locus - are at a
steady state level. These locii are plotted in Figure 1.
2.1 The PP Locus
The steady state level of pt will be where pitl - p: - 0 or where 9(ki,pt) - pt - 0. Using the




dk 1- Bp sp,~, f sy, - yp
1'he `Inada Conditions' on the utility ensure that both goods will always be demanded. This
implies that the PP locus, which is derived from the momentary equilibrium conditions, must
always lie between the p,,,;,, and p,,,a~ locii, which are upward sloping. Thus although the above
expression for the slope of the PP locus can be negative over some intervals of ki, over the whole
rca.l linc thc 1'P locus must. tend upwards.
Given p~ there is a unique level of ki that lies on the PP locus and sincc Bk G 0, the direction
of the vector field points downwards when k is to the right of the PP locus and upward when k is
to the left.
72.1.1 The PP Locus under Log-Linear Preferences
Under log-Iinoar preferences the PP curve ceases to exist in an intcrtemporal sensc because .v(pf) -
y(pr,kf) is not an intertemporal equation. }íowever, the locus s(pf) - y(pf,kr) can still bc plotted
and is usf~ful, sinfe, it dopicts the position of thc momentary equilibrium o( thc economy for every
If`VCI o( kf. '1'his locus is always upward sloping.
2.2 The KK Locus
The steady state level of kr will be where ki~t - kt - 0 or where rG(kt,pf) - kt - 0. Using the




when technological progress is in the Y sector, and
dP (1 t n)(1 f ox)2 -~(1 - a2)yk - ayxk~
dk IKK- ( 1 - ax)yr - ay2n
~KK
when the externality is in the X sector.
From the Rybcynski 'Theorem which tells us that that ykb ~ 1 and from y- t}n rr}~v or
r alon the KK curve, we know that when the externality is in the X sector the KK locus
rt,z itas g
slopes upward, and when the externality is in the Y sector the KK locus will also slope upward if
a is sufficiently small.
The concavity of the production functions, together with the "Inada Conditions", implies that
there is a maximum sustainable kt. For this level of k to be maintained all the economy's resources
must be placed into producing Y. This implies the KK locus must hit the p,,,;,, locus at this level.
Above the KK locus, since Viy C 0 for both versions of technological progress, the vector field
will be pointing to the left, and below the KK the vector field will be pointing to the right.
2.3 Existence of Steady State Equilibria
The economy will be in a steady state dynamic equilibrium where the KK and PY locii intersect,
this rnay occur many times or not at all. We know at the maximum sustainable kr that the PP
locus will be above the KK locus because the PP locus must always lie above the p„~;n locus.
HTherefore a condition for the existence of at least one intersection of the PP and KK cutves is that
the slope of the KK curve is greater than the slope of the PP curve at the origin. However, as in
Galor [N], there may be any odd number of intersections.
"I'hr oxistenic~ of rnulLiple steady state equilibria is a general resulL of Lhe ovcrlapping gencr-
atious framcwork. It occurs because the derivatives of the slopes of the two locii depend on the
third derivatives of the two production functions, J~(ki), jy(ki ), which are not restricted and so
the Lwo locii rnay intersect many times~.
'fhe existence of multiple steady state equilibria is important because it means that countries
identical in every respect except for their initial conditions can end up in very different steady
states. Thus `fundamentals' cannot determine a country's long run rate of growth. It is even
possible for a country with a high propensity to conswice the good with the growth externality to
grow slower than a conntry with a low propensity to consume this good!
2.3.1 Stabiiity oí Steady State Equilibria
Equations (1) and (2), show that the model can be described by the following the dynamical
systern.
kttr ~'(ke,Pe)
[ Patr ] - [ B(knPe)
To analyse the stability of this system around a steady state equilibrium (k,p) we need to




Appendix A.1 and A.2 show that when the learning by doing is in either sector that for o
sufficiently small, this system is alternately saddlepath stable and unstable and that saddlepaths
occur if and only if the PP curve is steeper than the KK curve.
h'urthermore, from Lhe direction of the vector field and the continuity of the system it is true
that there must exist a global stable manifold which connects all the steady state equilibria. This
~'1'he ability o[ the lhird derivative of the production function in the eingle sector overlapping generaLionx modcl Lo
cause multiple xteady xtate equilibria ie demonerated by Galor and Ryder [9] for Lhe eLandard model and Mountford
[13] for the endogenous growth model.
9global stable manifold will be a monotonically increasing curve in (pi,k~) space with the direction
of motiun along it taking points towards the saddlepath stable steady states, as shown in Figure
1.
2.1.2 The R.ate of Growth in the Steady State
At a steady state we know that kr - k and pr - p b't. This implies that ki, ki ,(i and l~ will also
be constant. National income per capita in the the steady state is given by
Xi f Y
p G t- PÍs(ki )atli ~- Ív(ki )~rli t
and so the growth rate in the steady state will be given by ~-`~-( 1 ~- ay) or (1 f ax).
[f the externality is in the Y sector then the model produces an interesting empirically verified
result. This is so because if there are multiple steady state equilibria, a steady state with a faster
rate of growth will also havc a larger k and p. '1'hus the country with thc lower rclativc pricc
of capital guods - higher p - will havc a fastcr growth rate. 'Chis is precis~~ly thc findiug of the
study by Delong and Summers [5], who found that there was a strong negative correlation betwern
growth rates and relative prices of capital goods.
2.4 Discussion of Assumptions and Summary of Results
This section has derived a two sector endogenous growth model along the lines of Galor's [8]
overlapping generations model with multiple steady state equilibria each with their own rate of
growth and where the growth rates of these steady states can accord with the empirical study
of Delong and Summers [5]. The assumptions needed to generate these results are not strong.
Preferences must be homothetic in order to ensure a balanced growth rate steady state. On
the production side, the assumption that ki ~ kf is the standard assumption of the two sector
overlapping generations model. Galor [8] has shown how the assumption that ki G ki leads to
indeterminacy a.
The assumption which needs the most discussion is the ~ is small assumption. This is used
alot because its intuition, that learning is gradual, is clear. However if you would like to restrict
'Drugeon [6] demonstrates the indeterminacy of the model when k; G k~ for the triple cobb-douglas economy.
10a- 1, there are alternative assumptions. Firstly one should note that the model works in this
case, for the learning externality in either sector for log-linear preferences. If you want to retain
more general preferences and if the learning externality is in the Y sector, then you must set
sy,~, t,tip, t yy, ~ 0. This implies that the responsiveness of savings to changes in the real rate
of return are limited so that the PP curve is always upward sloping. If the learning externality
is in the X sector and a- 1 then you must also assume that ky is sufficiently greater than ks.
The reason for this is that, as the appendix A.2 shows, the only use of the `~ is small' assumption
is to lirnit the sizc o( the term ay(ykxy - ypxk) and the absolute size of the term in brackets is
negatively related to the size of ky - k~, see Ryder [18~.
3 ~ading Equilibria with No 7ïansfer of Knowledge
In this section as discussed above, I make the additional assumption of log-linear preferences.
International trade changes the constraints that an economy faces. A closed economy can only
increase it's k by producing more Y, but an open economy can also import Y. I assume a world
economy consisting of two countries where there is no international borrowing available to either
country and therefore trade must balance in each period, that is
pc Mr t Mt - 0
where Mi , Mi are the imports of the investment good and consumption good respectively.
This section firstly proves tlcat there exists a unique momentary trading equilibrium by exam-
ining the reciprocal demand curve. The next subsection analyzes the effect of trade on a small
open economy. The following subsection then looks at the trade dynamics between a small and
a large economy. Finally the last subsection shows that from any initial conditions, the world
economy must converge to one of the steady state equilibria described in the previoua subsection.
3.1 The Reciprocal Demand Curves
F'ollowing Onika and Uzawa [15~, a country's reciprocal demand curve for imports is derived and
it is shown that, given k, it is weakly monotonic in p. Thus two countries' reciprocal demand
curves will intersect only once and the intersection will be between the autarkic prices of the two
11economies.
I will look at the demand for imports by each country of the investment good, M~ --ptMi .
From homotheticity and the definition of the production function for Y we can say
Á1i - ats(w~,(knPe))Le - Iy(ki )f~atLt or mi - s(wee(knPt)) - gt
Where mi is the level of imports ofthe investment good per efficiency units of labor. The derivative
of m~ with respect to pt is always non-negative,
y 8mi 8st 8wej
For Pt C P,n~„(kt) ~ mt - s(w~~(kt)) - Ív(kt) ~--- - 0
aPs aPt aps
y 8mi 8st 8w~~
For Pt ? Pmas(kt) --~ ms - s(we~(Pnks)) ~---- 1 0
aPt aPs aPt
For k G C -~ my s w~ k,
ami óst ów~,
p,n~n( e) Pt - pmox(kt) e- ( ~(Pe)) - Y( a Pt) ~ ópe - ów~~ áPt - yp 1 0
Figure 2 plots the reciprocal demand curves of two countries, names A and B. The intersection
of the (mi)A and -(mi )B curves is the international price. Ncte that it is uniqua and lies between
the two countries' autarkic prices.
3.2 Small Open Economy
A small open economy is a trading country that takes the equilibrium international price as given.
It is useful to define a new locus to analyse this case, the SS locus. This is the open economy
equivalent of the KK locus. It is the level of p such that next period's k will equal this period's
k. The SS curve has an interesting relationahip to the PP curve, which as explained in Section
2.1.1., due to log-linear preferences depicts the locus of the momentary equilibrium of the closed
economy. When the the 1'P curve lies above the KK curve the SS curve will be above the PI'
curve and when the PP curve is below the KK curve then the SS curve will be below the PP curve.
These relationships are depicted in Figure 3 and are demonstrated below.
3.2.1 Properties of the SS Locus
The SS locus gives the level of pt, given k~ such that kit~ - ki, where i stands for country i. We




The slope of the SS locus in the diversified area of production, is
aPi (1 i- n)(1 f ay~)2 t asiyk
~SS- a~ gw 8ki (1 f aye)(aw ay)- asryy
when learning is in the Y sector and
apt ~ss-
(1 f n)(1 f axi)~ f astxk
8k~ (1 f axi)(~a~) - asrxP
0
when learning is in the X sector. Both of these expressions will be positive if a is small 4.
The position o( the SS locus relative to the PP and KK locii can also be determined for
sufficiently small a. When the PP locus lies above the KK locus the SS locus will be above the
PP ]ocus and when the PP locus is below the KK locus then the SS locus must be below the PP
Incus. To see that this is true remember all points below the KK locus are where -~- ~ k,
(rtn)~
and points on the PP locus are where s(w,p) - y. Thus to make lltnl~ - kt, we need to lower
~
s, which since ~~ 0, implies p must fall. The assumption of a small a is needed only in the
case of learning in the X sector. IL is sufHcient to ensure that the savings effect dominates the
externality effect.
3.2.2 The Effects of Trade on the Small Open Economy
[Ising the SS curve and Figure 3 we can analyse the trade dynamics, the direction of trade and
the effect of trade on growth in the small open economy.
'fhe steady state equilibrium for this economy is the intersection of the SS curve with the
exogenously given world price. The trade dynamics are interesting. The appendix A.3 shows that
if the learning externality is in the Y sector, in the non-specialized production area the economy
will oscillate towards the steady state equilibriaand if the X sector has the externality, the economy
will monotonically converge on the steady state. In areas of specialised production, assuming a
unique steady state, there will be monotonic convergence to the steady state.
~See Mount[ord [14) for an examination ot amall country dynamics when a is lazge.
13We also know the direction of trade. Since the PP locus represents the locus where .c(pl) -
y(pt,kt) Lhon if the steady state is where the SS curve is above the YP CnrVe IL ITIUSt bC that the
e~conumy is impurting t.he investment good.
'I'hi~ ~~Ih,ct of trade ou gruwtó is less transparxnt. If the steady atate international price is abovc
th~~ steady state autarky price then we know that k will be higher than in autarky but we cannot
say whether the rate of growth is higher or not since the price and capital effects work against each
other, (yp G 0, yk 1 0) or (xy ~ 0, xk G 0). However if the intersection takes place in the area
of specialization o( the good with no learning by doing effects, then we know that in the long run
there will be no per capita growth. Thus in this case we can say that, since there is always positive
growth in the steady state in autarky, international trade has caused the sma11 open economy's
growth to decrease. In this case therefore international trade has had a very detrimental effect on
the welfare o( future generations of this economy. This is the case that is depicted in Figure J.
To summarize, although statically we know írom the gains from trade theorem of the standard
'l x Y x'l trade model, that the smail open economy gains from trade, dynamicaliy this may not
be the case and the small open economy may lose out.
3.3 T~ade Dynamics Between Small and Large Economies
I consider a two country world where countries, A a.nd B, only differ in their discount rates and in
their initial conditions. This means that both countries will have the same KK locus but will have
different PP locii. The relative positions of the two countries' PP and SS locii are very important.
The country with the higher savings rate will have a lower PP and SS curve for each level of k.
This will be used frequently in the analysis below. At first I will only consider the case where
learning is in the Y sector. The other case is straightforward and is briefly discussed at the end of
this subsect.ion. 1 will proceed by considering the following two examples.
3.3.1 Both Countries Have a Unique Autarkic Steady State
In this example the only steady state for the world economy is where the high saving propensity
country is very near to its autarkic steady state level of k and is large relative to the other country
which behaves therefore like a small open economy. The world price will thus be very close to the
14autarkic steady state price of the high saving propensity country. We know from the properties of
the SS locus that the low saving country will have a lower k than the high saving country and so
since yk ~ 0, the higher savings' propensity country will be growing faster than the other country
thus maintaining their relative sizes. This situation is therefore stable. This is depicted in Figure
4, where Country B is the re.latively small, low saving propensity country. Country B's SS curve
is above iCs PP curve and so it is importing the capital good in this steady state.
To see that this is the only steady state equilibrium, suppose that country ~ is the large econ-
omy and the world price is its autarkic steady state price. In this case country A will converge
towards the intersection of this price with it's SS curve. But this equilibrium will not hold in-
definately since at this point country A has a higher k than B and is therefore growing faster
than B. Eventually country A will become the large economy and the world will tend towards the
previously described steady state equilibrium.
3,3.2 Both Cquntries Flave Ivlultiple Autarkic Steady State Equilibria.
This subsection shows how trade can pull up or pull down the average rate of growth in the world
economy and how one country can catch up and overtake the growth rate and income level of
another country. The latter possibility is interesting also because of the reversal of trade directiou
which occurs during this transition.
Suppose that the low saving country in autarky is at its highest growth rate steady state
equiGbrium and that the high saving country is at its lowest growth rate steady state equilibrium.
This can mean that the low saving rate country is growing faster than the high saving rate country !
Now we know from the previous subsection that in the long run trading equilibria the high savings
rate country must be close to one of its autarkic steady state equilibria. But which one ? If initially
the low saving country is relatively economically large then it can pull up the high savings country
from a low to a high growth steady state, however, if the high savings rate country is initially
economically large then it will pull down the growth rate of the low savings rate economy.
The first possibility was also the catching up and overtaking example. Initially the high savings
rate country was poorer and growing slower than the low savings rate country. But we know in long
15run equilibrium from the previous subsection that the high savings rate economy will end up larger
and growing faster than the low savings rate economy. Notice along this transition the direction
of trade may reverse. Initially the high savings rate economy will operate near the autarkic steady
state price of the low savings rate country, this may initially be above the PP curve of the high
savings country which implies that this country imports capital goods. As the high savings rate
economy approaches its SS locus its k will increase and it will cross beneath the PP curve and so
export capital goods.
3.3.3 If Learning is in the X Sector
lf the learning externality is in the X sector precisely the same sort of dynamics will occur, only
now the faster growing country in the long run, will be in the country with the lowest saving rate.
This is because in equilibrium the country with the largest k will be growing slowest, since xk C 0.
Thus now the only stable equilibrium point is where the high saving tate country is operating near
an autarkïc steady state prïce of the iow saving rate country, on its SS iocus which is io the right
of the low savings rate country's autarkic steady state level of capital. The rest of the analysis
goes through in this mirror image fashion.
3.4 Global Tt-ade Dynamics
The previous section showed that in a steady state of the world economy it must be the case that
one country becomes economically large relative to the other and that this large economy must
be growing faster than the other economy. The previous section also showed that convergence to
a trading steady state equilibrium may be a gradual procesa involving changing relative income
levels and growth rates between countries and also changing trade patterns. This section gives
the sufficient conditions under which, regardless oí the initial sizes of the two countries and the
initial levels of k~ and kB, the world economy will converge to one of these trading steady state
equilibria. The appendix A.4 shows that these conditions will be met with the learning externality
in either sector if a is sufficiently small.
The two sufficient conditions for global convergence to a trading steady state equilibria are
(i) If sA C sB and kA ~ kB then k~ c kB b'j ? t
16(ii) If one cnnntr,Y is econornically large relative lo the other and if s~ c.4H then k~ G kH
'I'hc~ intuition bchind thesc conditions is straightforward. Again 1 will only go through thc
case for the learning externality in the Y sector, the other case again just being the mirror image.
Condition (ii) is simply the condition that the SS locii aze well behaved and lie beneath the PP
locus when the PP locus is below the KK locus, as described in section (3.2.1). Condition (i) says
that once the country with the higher savings rate has a higher level of k, that it will always have
a higher level of k.
Why does this ensure global convergence to a trading steady state equilibrium ? Condition
(i), since yk 1 0, implies that once the country with the higher savings rate has a higher level of
k, that it will always grow faster than the other country and thus will eventually become large
relative to the other country. Condition (ii) ensures that at some point the high savings country
must have a higher level of k, since if the other country had a larger k for a long time it would
grow relatively econornically large, but condition ( ii) ensures that if this happened then the higher
saving country rnust tend to a hïgher level oí k.
3.5 Discussion of Assumptions
In the dynamic trade model the assumptions that require the most discussion are those about
capital mobility, the form of technological progress and technological spillovers and again the
size of o. It is well known that capital mobility in the two sector model can cause indeterminacy.
Under factor price equalization for example, capital can flow from one country to the other without
altering factor prices. This means that the actual levels ot sectoral production in a country are
indeterminate. Thus one must either follow Onika and Uzawa (15] in assuming no capital mobility
or Fischer and Frenkel (7] in assuming an "adjustment cost~ investment function. To concentrate
on trade dynamics I chose the former. The assumption that technological progress spills over
across both sectors is necessary so that the direction of trade is not arbitrarily determined by the
initial direction of trade, see Stokey [19] for a similat argument. The assumption that learning
occurs in only one sector is also common in the literature, see Krugman [11] or Grossman and
Helpman [10] for example. If the externality were a"learning by usingr instead of "learning by
producing" capital goods, then this would be a different model, but intuitively one would expect
17very similar results. [n the present model the relative savings rate of an economy will determine
that economy's relative economic position in long run equilibrium. A higher saver will end up
producing more capital goods and so, if the externality is in the Y sector, will grow faster. Since
one would expect a higher saving economy, in a world with no lending or borrowing, also to use
more capital goods, one would expect similar results to the present model.
The assumption which needs the greatest discussion is the a is small assumption. If one would
like to set a- 1 then, when the learning externality is in the X sector, you must also assume
a unique and stable steady state equilibrium for the small open economy, which requires that
1}nal}r C 1 at the steady state. If this is true then all the above analysis will go through.
However when thc learning externality is in the Y sector, a small a is necessary for global con-
vergence. For the analysis of the small open economy and the dynamics between small and large
economies to remain valid when a- 1, one must also assume stability of the steady state for the
small open economy, which requires that Ittn)(t}y ~-1 at the steady state.
4 ~ading Equilibrium with Perfect Transfer of Knowledge
'I'his is the other common assumption about at the transferability oí knowledge and has been
analysed in the infinite horizon framework by Grossman and Helpman (10] and Itivera-Batiz and
Romer [16]. Although one can show under the current specification of technical progress that there
may exist multiple steady state equilibria each with their own rate of growth it is very difficult
to get any general result on the dynamics between these steady states. Instead I ahow that by
altering the specification of technical progress, under factor price equalisation the world economy
can be modelled as a single closed economy and thus may exhibit multiple steady state equilibria
each with their own rate of growth.
4.1 Technical Progress
I will again only describe the case where technical progress is in the Y sector. I now assume that
the knowledge at time t in each country is
i-~ . y. i-t y. . ai - a - a~
L; L; ~-o ;-o
18where o' is the proportion nf the world's population that live in country i, that is a' --~~ - 1,~ }l,~ '
Again Appendix 'l shows that the at -~~-ó Y; will also enable us to model the world economy
under factor price equalisation as a single closed economy.
Given this new definition and the assumption o( perfect transferability of knowledge with no
duplication, the addition to knowledge in each period is the sum of the knowledge produced in
both countries. 1'hat is aA ~ t aB~ -~- where Yi is the total world production of Y at tirne
t and Li is the world working population at time t. Thus we can write in the world economy
~ttr - 1 f yt ái
So the growth of knowledge in the world economy looks like the rate of growth of knowledge in a
closed economy with n` - 1.
4.2 Factor Price Equalization
]t is well knov.~n that in this two sector, two ccuntry world there will be factor price equalization
if both economies produce both goods. This will enable us to derive a PP and KK locus for Lhe
world economy as a whole and thus show that under factor price equalízation, the world economy
behaves like a single closed economy and that therefore the world economy itself has multiple
steady state equilibria.
4.2.1 PP,KK Locii under of Factor Price Equalisation
The PP locus is the locus of the momentary equilibrium for the world economy, it requires
~t3A(w~~(Pt))Li f ~t9B(we~(Pe))LE - }.ea f Yte
dividing through by atLt gives
~ASA(we~(Pt)) ~- aBSB(we~(Pt)) - yioA t yBaB - yt
One can think of this as a PP curve for a closed economy with a savings function which is a
weighted average of the savings functions of the two individual economies.
19'fhe KK curve for the world economy can be derived in similar fashion. We require
n e ~~ti ~iti
K~tt - Yi t Yi ---. k~ti ~i L~ - y~
From the above definition of technical progress this implies
yi
kitt -~1 f n)~l f yt)
From the above analysis the right hand side of this equation is only a function of pi and k~ and is
identical to the KK locus of a closed economy with a' - 1.
Thus we can conclude that since the world economy, under factor price equalization, behaves
Gke a single closed economy and so the world economy too may have multiple steady state eyui-
libria. Thus it may be possible to increase the growth rate of the world economy by increasing
world k. Such a policy may require co-ordination.
5 Conclusion
Thi~ paper has developed a two sector endogenous growth model which can generate multiple
steady state equilibria each with their own rate of growth. It has applied this model to a global
analysis of international trade and has shown that the world economy too may have multiple
steady state equilibria each with their own rate of growth. Ftirrthermore the transition to one of
these steady states is interesting and may involve reversals in trade direction, growth rates and
income levels. Specific cases were examined where international trade reduced a country's growth
rate to zero, where international trade pulled up the average growth rate in the world economy
and also where international trade pulled down the average growth rate in the world economy and
finally where international trade allowed one country's growth rate to catch up and overtake that
of another.
20Appendix A.
A.1. Stability Analysis of the Steady State Under Learning by Doing in the Y
Sector
The analysis of Section 1.3 gives the following two dimensional system of difference equations
kt}1 ~(kt,Pt) ]}n I}ayt
[ Pt}i ] - B(~t,Pe) - B(kt,Pt)
To analyse the stability of this system around a steady state equilibrium ( k,p) we need to
examine the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, J, of this system.
v
J- f 1}n 1}ay~ 1}n láayi L ~- yP- P~
"v~t, aPf}1
Defining the trace of J as trJ and the determinant of J as detJ, it is well known that the
eigenvalues oí J will be real, distinct and positive iftrJ ~ 0, detJ 1 0 and ~-(tr(J))2-4 x det(J) ~
0. Tediuos algebra can show that these conditions hold.
Relationship Between the PP and KK Locii and Stability
Given the above, the model will be a saddle point stable if (i) 1-tr(J) f det(J) C 0 and will be
unstable if (ii) 1-tr(J) t det(J) ~ 0 and trJ ~ 2. We will loo~ at the case where the PP curve is
upward slcping, the downward sloping case is straightforward: We will show that (il is satisfied
when the slope of the PP locus is steeper than that of the KK locus and (ii) is satisfiéd when the
KK locus is steeper.
We can rewrite 1-tr(J) f det(J) as (1 - t~k)(1 - By) - r,iPBk which in this model is
1
sPeat(1 f n)(1 f ay)2{~(1
f n)(1 f ayt)2 - yk~~sP~f~ f sP~~ -(1 f n)(1 t ayt)ZyP}
-. 1-tr J f det J~ 0 as s ~ y ? (1 ~ n)(1 ~ ayt)2yP
() ()~ P~i~ P~
~(1 f n)(1 f ayt)2 - yk
but this condition can be rewritten as the condition that the KK curve is steeper than the PP
curve, which is
(1 f n)(1 f aye)2 - yk ) yk
yP sP,t, } 9Pi - yP
It only remains to show that when 1-tr(J) f det(J) ~ 0 that trJ~ 2. This is true because
l-tr J } dCt J 1 U --~ 9 ~ 9, 1- yk YP~yk () () tJP - Pi n rt~ (1 i- n)(1 f ayt)~] - (1 f n)(1 f ayt)~]
The trace can be rewritten as
1 ~ 9Pitt yk
~ yP - gPi~
sP~tt (1 t n)(1 } ayt)~
Thus substituting in for yP - sP, implies
trJ ~ 1 - sp`yk
sPett(1 f n)(1 f ayt)Z
This expression is ~ 2 since from Rybcynski and the a is small assumption, yk 1(1 -}- n)(1 ~ ayt)2
actd from the upward sloping PP locus sP, ~ 9P,~,
`21A.2. Stability Analysis of the Steady State Under Learning by Doing in the X
Sector
'fhe analysis is similar to the previous section only now the two dimensional system of difference
equations is the following,
kt}1 ~(kt,Pt) 1}n 1}a:i
[ Pl}t - B(kt,Ps) ] - [ 9(knPa) ]
To analyse the stability of this system around a steady state equilibrium (k,p) we need to
examine the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, J, of this system.
ltax k- a xk 1}ax y ayx




Again it can be shown trJ and 0~ 0 but a must be small for detJ ~ 0 and thus for the
eigenvalues of J to be real, distinct and positive. This is because detJ is the following expression.
1
.vn~t, (1 t n)(1 f ax)2 {-sn~[(1 f axi)Yk - ayxkl t aY[Ykxy - Yyxkl }
'l'he second expression in the curly bracket is positive and a must be small enough for the (irst
bracket to outweigh it. Alternatively one could assume that ky - kx is sufficiently large since this
expression is negatively related to this, see Ryder [18].In the following subsection we will call the
second expression in the curly bracket óy.
Relationship Between the PP and KK Locii and Stability
Again following section A.1 We will rewrite 1-tr(J) } det(J) as (1 - r(ik)(1 - By) - tlipBk which in
this model is
1 ~ z
sv„~(1 f n)(1 -}. ax)2
{[(1}n)(1{.axs) - [(1}ax)Yk-aYxkll[sYiii}9fl~1-(I}n)(1-~axi) yv~óy}
~ 1-tr(J) } det(,I) ~ 0 as s } s ~ (1 f n)(1 ~ ayt)2yP - 6y
~ v~t~ v~
~(1 t n)(1 f axi)2 - [(1 f axYk - yxk]
but this condition can be rewritten as the condition that the KK curve is steeper than the PP
curve, which is
(1 ~- n)(1 } axi)~ -(1 -} ax)Yk f Yxk ) Yk
( 1} axYA - YxA '9P~}~ } 3Pi - YP
'l'he proof Lhat when I-tr(.I) } det(J) ~ 0 that Lr.l~ 2 is similar to that in section A.l.
A.3. Small Economy Dynamics Under Diversification
If there is technological progress in the Y sector we have that
3(Pa)
ke}1 -(1 f n)(1 f aY)
Thus
dki}1 -as(Ps)Yk
dkt -(1 i- n)(1 f aY)~
22This will be between -1 and 0 for a small enough and so the dynamics will be stable and oscillating.




(1 f n)(1 } ax)
dketi -as(Pi)xk
dki - (1 t n)(1 ~ ax)z
This will be between 0 and 1 for a small enough and so the dynamics will be stable.
A.4. Global Convergence Conditions
The two conditions for global convergence given in section O are
(i) If sA ~ sB and kA ~ kB then k; c kB Vs 1 t
(ii) If one country is economically large relative to the other and if sA C sB then ki G kB
Section (3.2.1) explained how condition (ii) is true if a is sufficiently small. Condition (i) will
also be true for sufficiently low a since
A st B
sB
(l~n)a~ t} - (l~n)a~
This implies that condition (i) will hold if the saving effect dominates the externality effect. When
the externality is in the X sector there is no conflïct between the two effecis but when the externality
is in the Y sector this requires a small a.
ki~~ - and k ~ -
23Appendix B
The growth model under the alternative specification of technical progress
We now define L~ - L b~ t and knowledge at time t as ai -~;-óY,. This implies, since in all
periods a~s(we,(pi))L - Yi, that
~~ti ~ - 1 t s(we~(Pi))L
i
Thus the KK locus depicts the level of pi given k~ such that
yi - k~
1 t s(we~(Pa))L
'I'his lorns has the same properties as the other specification that is the partial derivativo wit.h
respcrt to p of the above rclationship gives
áp(lts)-yiáv
~l t s(we~(Pe))L~~
which is negative as long as both goods are produced, and the slope of the KK curve is given by
dP Ik~ii-ko-o-
I1 f s(w~e(Pt)).LIZ -aa } s)yk
dk (1~-s)yy-yi~
which is also positive near the origin again using the Rybcynski Theorem.
In the world economy of two countries that differ in their rate of time preference, where
knowledge is perfectly transferable and where the addition to knowledge in each period is the sum
of the knowledge produced in both countries, then
ait~ - ~~ - Y~~ t Y~e
In equilibrium under factor price equalisation we know that aisA(w~,(p~))LA } aisd(we,(pe))l.H -
Yi~ t Y~H and so wc can say
~it~ - 1 f ,sA(we~(Pi))~~~ f sB(we~(Pi))L~ - ~(Pt)
ai
The analysis of the YY,KK locii of the world economy can now be carried out as in the other
specification of technical progress in section 4.1
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Figure 1. The autarkic growth model drawn for the case where there are










Figure 2. The reciprocal demand curves oC countries A and B. The inter-










Figure 3. The small open economy drawn for the case where international
trade causes specialization. Since the intersection of the SS curve with the
international price Ges above the pm,~ curve, the small open economy will
produce only good X. If the learning externality is in sector Y, the small
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Figure 4. The steady state for the world economy for countries with dif-
ferent preferences and unique autarkic steady states, when the leazning ex-
ternality is in the Y sector. Country 4 is larger and is growing faster then
country B. The international price is very close to Country r1's autarkic
price.
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